This paper presents an overview of the technologies and the methodologies used in Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (NIDPS). Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Introduction
Increasing size and complexity of the Internet and Intranet networks have led to increasing number of vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Thus, the internal and external attacks on the information systems are increasing at an alarming rate. Also, these are becoming more severe and sophisticated. The attackers find ingenious ways to bypass the security controls and to compromise the security and the well functioning of the information systems. They are motivated by financial, political, and military objectives. In this context, defending wide area networks from malicious traffic, unauthorized access to systems involves many problems. In security information systems Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (NIDPS) are important tools to detect possible incidents and also, to attempt to stop them in real time. Due to changing attacks, intrusion detection methodologies and technologies continuously evolve, adding new detection capabilities, to avoid detection. They must adapt to new forms of malware, to the public networks, increased traffic.
Concepts of Intrusion Detection
An intrusion is a successful action to gain access to an information system, to compromise it or to make it unavailable. This is possible due to the presence of vulnerability in the target system that can be exploited by a motivated intruder. Intrusion Detection and Prevention is the process of monitoring the information systems by sensors or agents and analyzing the collected information to detect and to attempt to stop the attacks in real time, identifying vulnerabilities, the violation of security policies or standard security practices. An Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) is a tool that monitors information systems, collects, analyzes information, and initiates responses when an intrusion is detected. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) mainly work as defensive mechanisms. They only alert the system administrators that an incident has occurred. Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) can take some actions to attempt to stop the attack, such as breaking the connection or modifying the firewall rules to deny access to the intruder. The response of the classic IDS can be slow if the system administrator is busy while the response of the IPS is automatic. An architecture that uses together IPS and IDS technologies is the best solution for defense in depth. Conceptually, a generic IDPS consists of modular components. It mainly has the following components: monitoring system, storage, analyzer, and responder.  Monitoring system -monitors and logs the events in a computer system or network;  Storage -stores information, called audit record, about suspicious activities or intrusions; also, the security policies used in analysis are stored;  Analyzer -uses different analysis methodologies to detect the incidents;  Responder -the response mechanism of incidents. The IDPSs could be classified as:  By detection methodology [12] , [18] :
-misuse-based detection -anomaly-based detection -stateful protocol analysis  By activity [12] :
-network-based -wireless-based -network behavior analysis -host-based  By behavior on detection:
-passive -active  By collection and analysis frequency:
-continuous -periodic The detection methodologies describe the characteristics of the analyzer. Misuse-based detection [18] represents known attacks in the form of a pattern or a signature. The main issues in misuse detection methodologies are how to make a signature that encompasses all possible variations of an attack, and that do not also match normal behavior. [12] of comparing the profiles of normal behavior against real activity of the system to identify significant deviations. The profiles are developed by monitoring the real activity of users, hosts, networks or applications over a period of time, called a training period, and preservation of what is considered without intrusion. The profiles can be static or dynamic. Stateful protocol analysis uses protocol model, the IDS sensors perform full protocol decoding for some application-layer protocols. The process [12] compares profiles of normal protocol activity for each protocol state against observed events in the system to identify deviations. The "stateful" [12] means that the IDPS can understand and can track the state of network, transport and application a protocols. There are four main groups of IDPS technologies [12] : Network-Based [12] -monitors network traffic for network segments or devices (e.g. packets captured by network interface in promiscuous mode) and analyze the network, transport and application protocol activity to identify possible attacks originating from outside or inside of the system. Wireless [12] which monitors wireless network traffic and analyzes its wireless networking protocols to identify attacks. [12] which examines network traffic to identify unusual traffic flows. Host-Based is installed locally on host machine and monitors the characteristics of the host and events occurring with that host. It analyzes network packets entering and leaving the host, log files on the host, processes running on the host, attempts to execute malicious code. It checks the integrity of system files, files access and modification, CPU usage. By the type of audit data they analyze, there are operating system-level intrusion detection systems and application-level intrusion detection systems.
Misuse-based detection

Network Behavior Analysis (NBA)
The first three are network intrusion detection technologies. Network-based is older while wireless and network behavior analysis are newer and have been developed due the increasing complexity of networks.
Network Intrusion Detection
Primary source of a Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (NIDPS) is network traffic. In the network traffic the data is passed through the layers from source to destination. The four TCP/IP layer are: hardware layer, internet protocol (IP) layer, transport layer, application layer. A typical component NIDPS [12] is composed of sensors, one or more management servers, multiple consoles and optionally one or more database servers. Sensors -monitor and analyze the activity. The sensor can be an appliance-based -a specialized hardware and sensor software or software only. An appliance-based sensor includes specialized NICs and NIC drivers and specialized processors that assist in analysis.
Sensors can be deployed in the following modes [12] : -Inline -network traffic can pass directly through a NIDPS - Figure 2 . This is by definition active as it can inspect every network packet and react in real time on dangerous activities, e.g. dynamically block network traffic that it believes to be malicious. Some inline sensors can be hybrid firewall/IDPS devices but can be specific IDPS.
Fig. 2. Inline NIDS
-Passive -monitors a copy of the actual network traffic - Fig. 3 . It monitors traffic using a network tap or spanning port [12] . -Network Tap (Test Access Port) -is a direct connection between a sensor and the physical network media itself, such as a fiber optic or copper cable. Fiber Taps [16] split the network signal into two streams, enabling to the network and monitoring devices to receive the signal. The signal must be regenerated to have adequate strength. -Spanning port [12] -which is a port of a switch that can see all network traffic going through it. If a switch is configured or reconfigured incorrectly, is under heavy loads, its spanning port might not be able to see all traffic.
Fig. 3. Passive NIDS
Generally, intrusion prevention techniques require that the sensors be deployed inline mode because the passive sensors monitor a copy of traffic and cannot easily break the connection. They still can place packets onto network in order to disrupt network connection but such method is more cumbersome and less effective. Administrators must decide where the IDPS sensors should be located consistent with security needs. Most NIDPSs mainly rely on protocol analysis. The types of attacks detected are [12] :  network layer attacks -spoofed IP address, illegal IP header length. The IP, ICMP, IGMP protocols are analyzed;  transport layer attacks -port scanning, unusual packet fragmentation, SYN floods. The TCP and UDP protocols are analyzed;  application layer attacks -buffer overflows, format string attacks, malware transmission. Mainly, these protocols: DNS, FTP, HTTP, IMAP, IRC, POP, SMTP are analyzed;
 policy violation -use of inappropriate Web sites or use of forbidden application protocols. Network-based IDPSs [12] cannot detect attacks within encrypted network traffic, as virtual private network (VPN) connections, HTTP over SSL (HTTPS), and SSH sessions. The analysis must be performed on payloads within encrypted network traffic, thus IDPSs analyze the payloads before it is encrypted or after it is decrypted. However, some IDPSs can also monitor encrypted communications to identify known vulnerabilities or misconfiguration. Network-based IDPSs [12] may be unable to perform full analysis under high loads, especially if stateful protocol analysis methods are in use. To prevent its disability it uses high-bandwidth network cards, limits the number of simultaneous connections, sets timeouts to expire connection state. Also, various types of attacks, such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, and anomalous activity can attempt to exhaust a IDPS sensor's resources and to make them unavailable. The first methodology was the development of simple signatures [13] , patterns to be searched in traffic. In the initial concept, string matching, each signature is written for key phrases or commands associated with a known attack. It creates a list of signatures. An incoming packet [13] is compared, byte by byte, with each signature for particular characteristic of malicious traffic, and when there is a match, an alert is generated. Then the next packet is read into memory and the process begins again. Another concept is protocol analysis. In "protocol analysis" [9] There are IDS signatures that focus on IP, TCP, UDP and application layer protocol header value [8] . Any header value can be used in signatures, but the most commonly used header-related signature elements are [8] :  source and destination IP addresses (particularly reserved, non-routable, and broadcast addresses)  port numbers in TCP or UDP protocols (port scanning attacks)  header length  unusual packet fragmentation  particular TCP flag combinations in TCP headers  the protocol field in IP headers ( -can cause a denial-of-service by repeatedly sending a non-zero offset fragment to a host.  the source and destination ports are set to 21 ( FTP servers). In normal FTP traffic, it sets a high port number (greater than 1023) as the source and port 21 as the destination [7] . Because ICMP and UDP [8] protocols are connectionless it checks each packet. The TCP protocol is connection-oriented. In this case [8] , address and port are constant in all packets in the connection and they can be checked once, but TCP flags should be different among the packets in the session, so it will check every packet. A header-based signature could include any one or more characteristics. The simple signatures are more prone to false positives while the more complex signatures are prone to false negatives. An example: two or more characteristics can occur separately in legitimate traffic but combined in same packet are very low. It can create a signature set based on known exploit programs or known and potential vulnerabilities. The signature set based on known exploits has the disadvantage that will be a significant delay between the time the exploit occurs and the time the IDPS can recognize its activity. This signature set is written after the exploit has become public. A signature set based on protocol analysis has the advantage of looking for any signs of abnormal or suspicious activity by checking various fields for abnormal values. Abnormal values for fields protocols can be used only in the presence of existing vulnerabilities. By using the protocol analysis techniques there will be much better detection of known and unknown attacks, it will be more difficult for attackers to evade through change to exploits' code or NIDPS obfuscation. Above there is a static analysis. For better performance dynamic protocol analysis [8] [15] . In both cases the code is different and more sophisticated with each iteration to avoid detection. The polymorphic malware code has two parts; one part remains constant with each iteration. For example, if viruses, a virus have a virus decryption routine (VDR) and an encrypted virus program body (EVB). In this case, it is easier to provide a complex signature to identify the constant part. The metamorphic malware is more difficult to detect. For its detection advanced techniques [15] are used, such as generic decryption scanning, negative heuristic analysis, emulation and access to virtualization technologies. In order to detect the attacks, a traffic normalizer [14] should be placed in path of traffic and to normalize the packet stream. The normalizer should remove the potential ambiguities. Thus, the NIDPSs monitor normalized traffic. Fig. 7 . Typical locations of normalizer and NIDS. Source [14] By protocol analysis-based as superior intrusion detection solution the packets are examined in detail, using the protocol definitions and making the same processing as a Web server, FTP server or operating system. By this method a much wider range of attacks can be detected, including known and unknown attacks. Web or FTP servers usually run on wellknown port numbers. In static applicationlayer protocol analysis standard port numbers for protocols are used. But, there are Web or FTP servers that run on other ports with benign or malicious intent, and also, non Web servers run on 80/tcp in order to evade security monitoring. The attackers [20] use application protocols on non-standard ports or on ports assigned to other protocols: Trojans that use non-standard ports; botnets use the IRC protocol on ports other than 666x/tcp; hidden FTP servers for filedistribution on ports other than 21/tcp. Thus, the analysis engine searches "Login failed" string in the payload and if this is found an alert is generated. In "protocol analysis" [9] NIDPS sensors perform full protocol decoding for application layer protocols, such as DNS, FTP, HTTP, SMTP. Thus, they have the ability to detect both known and unknown types of attacks. In the stateful protocol analysis [11] approach the NIDPS sensor monitors and analyzes all of the events for the duration of a session and adds stateful characteristics to the protocol analysis. It records information about the connection state. The NIDPS performs correlations among the events occurred and the state of the network, among different events over a connection. Thus, the sensors can detect attacks that cannot be recognized by another way. [11] over a connection. The NIDPS sensors that use stateful protocol analysis for detection can do this. An example is the server's response of a FTP command [11] . At an attempt to access a FTP server it returns a numeric code that indicates the status of the response. A 2xx FTP status code indicates that the command has successfully completed, while a 5xx FTP status code indicates that the command was not successful, and the error is permanent. Thus, it can recognize brute force attacks, by identifying many failed requests in a session. 2xx status code in the response shows that an attacker attempt was successful. Another example of state is the phases of a session [11] . The phases of an FTP session are [11] : connection, authentication, transaction and disconnection. Unauthenticated users should only perform providing usernames and passwords. If the user has authenticated successfully, the session is in authenticated state and the user can perform specific commands, such as, change directory, list the contents of the directory, delete files, delete a directory, make a new directory, copy files. If these commands are performed in the unauthenticated state it can be an attack. Because the deep packets inspection (the header and the payload) is hard or even impossible, the flow-based intrusion detection is a current option studied [2] . With such approach, the communication patterns within the network are analyzed, instead of the contents of individual packets. The flow-based intrusion detection uses flows for input data, instead of packets. A flow [4] is defined as a set of IP packets passing an observation point in the network during a certain time interval. A TCP flow corresponds to a single network connection, while a UDP flow is a stream of packets terminated by an inactivity period. This information is in the form of Netflow [3] or IPFIX [4] . The flow is mainly characterized by [2] , [3] , [4] :  source and destination IP address;  source and destination port number for TCP and UDP;  protocol field of IP header. Also, the following parameters are important:  Type of Service (Diffserv, ECN) value;  TCP flags of TCP headers;  packets size;  flow size. The flow-based detection should be combined with packets inspection in detection process [2] , [5] , [6] . At the first stage flow-based can be used to detect certain attacks. At the second stage, packet inspection can be used for suspicious activities previously discovered. This combined technique is used especially for the analysis of high-speed networks. It applies to DoS, scan, worm, spam, botnet detection. Accounting flows is a two-step process [2] : flow exporting and flow collection. These tasks are performed by two components: flow exporter and flow collector. The flow exporter, also known as observation point creates flow records from observed traffic. The flow collector retrieves the flows created by the flow exporter and stores them in a form suitable for further monitoring or analysis. The analysis of exported flow data for intrusion detection can be decomposed into three principal steps [6] :  flow data is received from the monitoring devices and decoded;  the flow data is normalized and preprocessed in order to provide appropriate input to the detection algorithm;  applies a detection algorithm in order to discover network intrusions. The detection algorithms can be [6] :  threshold-based -that uses predefined or adaptive thresholds for specific measures;  principal component classifiers (PCC) -the set of flows are decomposed into their components and the algorithms detects anomalies in multivariate time-series;  outlier detection algorithms -uses a set of normal data to the learned normal behavior; an outlier is a data point which is very different from a normal data;  rule learning algorithms -that learn classification rules from training data containing, labeled normal and attack data. A flow-based method of detection is subspace method, detailed in [1] . With this method the traffic flows (IP flow) are aggregated at the Origin-Destination (OD) level. It uses samples of flow data from every router. Sampling is random, capturing 1% of packets entering every router. Sample packets are characterized by 5-tuple, IP address and port number for both source and destination, and protocol type. In each sampled IP flow it is also recorded the number of bytes and packets. The OD flow can be represented as a sum of normal and anomalous components, x=^x + ~x . It examines three distinct representations of sampled flow traffic, as time series of bytes, packets and IP flow, all indexed by the 5-tuple headers. Each anomaly results in a value of the ||~x|| 2 that exceeds the threshold statistic. The set of anomalies is cast as triples of (traffic type, time, OD flow), where "traffic type" is one of Bytes (B), Packets (P), or IP-Flows (F). It aggregates all triples with the same time value, placing some triples into the new categories BP, BF, FP, and BFP. Thus, a BP anomaly is one that is detected in both byte and packet time series at the same time. It groups triples to form anomalies in space (all OD flows corresponding to the same traffic type and time) and time (all triples with consecutive time values, having the same traffic type). Finally, a set of anomalies results. Each anomaly is due to a set of anomalous OD flows. Thus, it detects the network-wide traffic anomalies, by aggregating sampled flow measurements at the origin-destination level. The paper [21] proposes a combination of timeslot-based and flow-based analyses in network anomaly detection. A first approach is a combined method using the timeslot-based and flow-based in parallel. Network traffic is inputted to both detectors and analyzed by each detector. Because, a large buffer storage in a flow-based analysis represents a problem, to reduce the amount of data to be analyzed by flow-based analysis, a packet of sampling and setting short timeouts was made. The method has the disadvantage that it may result a lack of the information needed to detect anomalous flows. To avoid this, timeslot-based analyses have been proposed in the first stage and flow-based analyses in the second stage. The timeslot-based detection has two modules, header-based detection module and payloadbased detection module. Also, in timeslotbased detection, firstly, each slot is classified based on a threshold (Th ac ), into anomalous slot candidate and normal slot. For normal slots the detector does not transmit anything. By another threshold (Th as ), the anomalous slot candidates are classified into anomalous slots and suspicious slots. For anomalous slots, the timeslot-based detector triggers alerts. For suspicious slots, in a second stage (flow-based analysis) is performed a detailed analysis.
Conclusion
There are many ways to achieve network security and NIDPS are a complement to them. Good knowledge of the networks, how the protocols work, network threats and vulnerabilities lead to a strong defense in depth. So when it makes a mistake or gets sloppy, it leaves a hole that attackers find and exploit. NIDPS must recognize attacks so that their exploitation can be prevented. Good knowledge of methods and technologies incorporated into every product leads to a good choice of products implemented since each product has its own detection capabilities and every computer system has specific threats and vulnerabilities. Depending on the degree of appropriateness between the informatic system and the NIDPSs, a more or less effective and complete activity of a monitoring and control results. All the methodologies combine in modern products, exploit inherent strengths of each approach and prevent the weakness from leading to a superior product. Network intrusion detection systems have a number of fundamental limitations. Many systems have a very high false positive rate, they are vulnerable of evasion attacks, denial-of-service attacks. Therefore they must be improved. They must adapt to new types of attacks, to achieve the security and protection of networks and computer infrastructures. It is clear that using dynamic protocol analysis increases the number of security breaches that can be detected.
